Liberty University Law Review
Volume 14
Issue 2 Spring 2020

Article 6

January 2020

When the Hair Must Be Split: The Importance of Distinguishing
between Omissions and Commissions in Sexual Abuse Cases
Clint Hamilton

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lu_law_review

Recommended Citation
Hamilton, Clint (2020) "When the Hair Must Be Split: The Importance of Distinguishing between
Omissions and Commissions in Sexual Abuse Cases," Liberty University Law Review: Vol. 14 : Iss. 2 ,
Article 6.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lu_law_review/vol14/iss2/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Liberty University School of Law at Scholars
Crossing. It has been accepted for inclusion in Liberty University Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholars
Crossing. For more information, please contact scholarlycommunications@liberty.edu.

NOTE
WHEN THE HAIR MUST BE SPLIT: THE IMPORTANCE OF
DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN OMISSIONS AND COMMISSIONS IN
SEXUAL ABUSE CASES
Clint Hamilton†
ABSTRACT
Under normal circumstances, a man who threatens witnesses of a crime to
keep silent about its occurrence is as guilty as the principal who committed the
crime in the first place. However, according to the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire, church elders who actively and deliberately threaten a mother into
concealing the sexual abuse of her own five-year-old girl have not committed
an active tort, but instead omitted to act, for which they cannot be liable. By
failing to distinguish the active threat from the passive failure to report abuse,
the New Hampshire Supreme Court gave Jehovah’s Witnesses elders tacit
permission to engage in cover-ups with impunity, allowing them to be secure
in the knowledge that the victims of their deceptions and manipulations would
never have any chance to hold them accountable for the wrongs thus inflicted.
Traditionally, courts are reluctant to impose liability for acts of omission.
That reluctance is woven into the fabric of American law, and it is one that
should be both affirmed and respected. However, where courts uphold the
portrayal of affirmative acts of negligence as passive failures to act, they deny
victims of sexual abuse the opportunity to recover damages from those who
assisted the abuser in hiding his crimes. This occurred in New Hampshire
because the court, hesitant to impose liability for inaction, did not even begin
to consider whether the alleged incident contained inaction or action. This
dismal result could have been avoided without making a change in existing
law, and liability can in the future be imposed without expanding liability for
acts of omission, as long as courts are able and willing to carefully and
deliberately draw a line between an affirmative act and an act of omission.
This Note will examine and explain the policies behind the limited liability
framework traditionally applied to acts of omission. It will then examine how
that framework was misapplied by the New Hampshire Supreme Court in a
suit alleging the willful concealment of sexual abuse and will argue that the
† Clint Hamilton is a second-year J.D. candidate at Liberty University School of Law,
specializing in Constitutional Law and appellate advocacy. He has a passion for tackling
unresolved conflicts at the front edge of the law and developing well-reasoned syntheses of
traditional, conservative legal doctrines and the modern demands of a rapidly changing
concept of justice.
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Court should have analyzed the case under a standard negligence framework.
It will then explain how that framework would have provided justice for the
victims without violating the policies behind limited liability for acts of
omission.
I. INTRODUCTION
There are some crimes that by their very nature give rise to a feeling of
confusion, horror, and consternation in the hearts of humans. The sexual
assault of a five-year-old girl by her father is one such crime. When first we
hear of an instance where that crime has been committed, we can hardly
comprehend how any sort of man would even conceive of the act.
Afterwards, it is impossible to communicate in any language the entirety of
the horror that we feel for the sake of this unfortunate child and the burden
she must bear for the rest of her life. For those who practice law in hopes of
preventing (or at the very least mitigating) the very tragedy which has
unfolded, there is a deep feeling of consternation at the inadequacy of the
civil justice system.
The heinous character of the crime, the sympathetic nature of the victim,
and the helplessness of her plight cries out for justice in a system that at times
appears ill-equipped to provide an adequate remedy. Far too often, wellmeaning attorneys and sympathetic judges find their hands seemingly tied
behind their backs by longstanding principles of civil liability and due
process. One potential arena in this fight is centered around whether
individuals have a duty to report abuse that they know or suspect is taking
place.
The abuser’s most powerful enemy is the Samaritan who exposes him; but
his most powerful ally is the common man who passes by in apathy. As one
court wrote, “[C]hild abuse is more often than not committed in secret upon
silent and powerless victims. It takes no leap of logic to conclude that the
secretive commission of child abuse is likely to continue absent intervention
by appropriate authorities to whom the abuse has been reported.”1
Conversely, there is little question that at least some instances of abuse might
have been prevented if someone had simply informed the appropriate
authorities. This, in turn, has led some victims to sue persons who knew
about the abuse but refused to intervene.2
The biggest hurdle these victims face is the general principle that
individuals are not subject to a general duty to act or intervene to prevent
criminal acts (or other harm) against another person.3 Of course, there are
1. J.A.W. v. Roberts, 627 N.E.2d 802, 812 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
2. See, e.g., Mayeux v. Charlet, 203 So. 3d 1030 (La. 2016).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
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several exceptions to this where affirmative duties are acknowledged.4 One of
the most prominent characteristics of situations producing duties to act is
some sort of relationship or interaction between the alleged non-actor and
either the plaintiff or a third-party perpetrator.5
As courts around the nation grapple with this question of whether to
establish civil liability under the common law for failing to report sexual
abuse, the answers and rationales have varied. Those jurisdictions which have
upheld a common law cause of action tend to rely upon the existence of some
special relationship between the defendant and either the victim or the
abuser.6 This indicates that courts are unwilling to create an entirely new
cause of action and instead seek to fit failure to report abuse under the
existing nonfeasance framework. Where such a special relationship does not
exist, unfortunately, the common law tends to provide no remedy.
The reasonable solution for such a problem, of course, is for the
legislatures to remedy through statute what the courts through judicial
opinions cannot. Acting through the proxy of the legislature, the people may
impose statutory civil liability where the courts, acting solely under the
authority of the common law, lack the power to develop new causes of action.
Recognizing this, some legislatures have acted. Many states have passed
mandatory reporting statutes requiring certain professions or other
categories of persons to report suspected or confirmed child abuse.7
Unfortunately, the legislature cannot—or, on occasion, will not—act on
every possible eventuality. Moreover, when victims fall into statutory gaps
which leave them just out of reach of civil remedies, courts struggle to provide
justice in an imperfect system through existing common law remedies. For
instance, where a statute does not provide for a civil cause of action in the

4. See id. at § 314 cmt. a (summarizing exceptions to the general rule).
5. See, e.g., id. at § 314A (duty of affirmative action when a special relationship exists
between the defendant and the injured party); id. at § 314B (duty of affirmative action toward
an endangered or injured employee); id. at §§ 316–320 (duty of affirmative action when
defendant has control of a third person); id. at §§ 321–322 (duty of affirmative action when
previous or current action creates an unreasonable risk of harm or actual harm to another
person); id. at §§ 323–324, 324A (duty of affirmative action upon the voluntary undertaking
of a duty).
6. Cf. Doe v. Liberatore, 478 F. Supp. 2d 742 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (duty to report exists where
a fiduciary relationship was established between the plaintiff and the defendant); Marquay v.
Eno, 662 A.2d 272 (N.H. 1995) (duty to report existed because the student/teacher relationship
created an affirmative duty to report); Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 302 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)
(therapist’s special relationship with the patient created a duty to report where the therapist
knew that the patient was sexually assaulting the patient’s daughter).
7. See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (2019).

342213-Liberty_Law_14-2_Text.indd 109

5/13/20 7:35 AM

384

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:2

event of violation, there is a substantial risk that victims will be left without a
remedy against the people who ignored their plight.
In 1967, the State of New Hampshire criminalized failure to report, but
did not explicitly create a corresponding private right of action.8 When a
victim asked the New Hampshire Supreme Court to rule otherwise in
Marquay v. Eno, the Supreme Court indicated that the omission was
deliberate, and no statutory cause of action would exist unless and until the
legislature indicated an intent to create one.9 In Berry v. Watchtower Bible &
Tract Society of New York., Inc.,10 however, the court encountered a much
more nuanced set of circumstances. In Berry, a Jehovah’s Witness told
multiple elders in her congregation that her husband was sexually assaulting
her two daughters.11 Rather than report the abuse, the elders kept silent and
pressured the mother to keep silent as well.12
Years later, when the two girls sued the elders for negligence, breach of
fiduciary duty, and willful concealment of abuse, the trial court used a
combination of negligence law, cleric-penitent privilege, and the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to justify dismissing all
claims.13 A majority on the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court’s ruling, but on other grounds, specifically ruling that the elders had
breached no duty to the plaintiffs.14 The majority decision’s holdings on
statutory negligence and fiduciary duty are not in dispute. However, the
majority used only a partial standard in its common law negligence analysis,
which resulted in an incomplete analysis and an erroneous conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND
Child victims of sexual abuse in New Hampshire suffer the same legal
hurdles that exist in other jurisdictions when attempting to obtain a remedy
from those who fail to report ongoing abuse. The nonfeasance framework in
New Hampshire is adopted from the Restatement (Second) of Torts.15 In the
words of the New Hampshire Supreme Court, “The duty to do no wrong is a
legal duty. The duty to protect against wrong is . . . a moral obligation only,

8. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29 (2019).
9. Marquay v. Eno, 662 A.2d at 277–78.
10. Berry v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc., 879 A.2d 1124 (N.H. 2005).
11. Id. at 1125.
12. Id. at 1127.
13. Id. at 1126.
14. Id. at 1128.
15. Walls v. Oxford Mgmt. Co., 633 A.2d 103, 104–05 (N.H. 1993).
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not recognized or enforced by law.”16 Thus, there were large groups of people
who had no duty to report abuse to the proper authorities. This, in turn,
meant that there was little incentive to report said abuse.
The New Hampshire legislature attempted to remedy this issue in 1979 by
enacting a mandatory reporting statute that applied to numerous professions
in the State.17 The statute made failure to report punishable as a misdemeanor
in an attempt to create the previously missing incentive.18 Unfortunately for
victims of sexual abuse, the legislature did not indicate a desire to create civil
liability under the statute.19 As a result, even if an individual violated the
statute by failing to report abuse and was criminally convicted of the
violation, the victims could not receive a civil remedy for their injuries.
This interpretation of the reporting statute was confirmed when students
from the Mascoma Valley Region School District argued sixteen years later
that the statute implied a private right of action for statutory negligence.20
The New Hampshire Supreme Court rejected the students’ argument, citing
a lack of evidence that the legislature intended to create such a cause of
action.21 Although the Court did rule that the students’ suit could go forward,
it did so based on common law claims of negligent supervision and negligent
hiring by school officials, rather than via any claim for failure to report.22
Thus, the lack of a remedy still persisted where no special relationship
existed.
When the court in Berry v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York,
Inc. faced the question of whether a common law claim for failure to report
abuse could be raised, the court addressed a question of first impression in
New Hampshire.23 For the first time, the New Hampshire Supreme Court was
faced with plaintiffs who asserted a blanket common law claim for failure to
report (among other claims). Rather than following the strategy of Marquay
in relying solely upon an established common law claim, the plaintiffs in
Berry proffered a nonfeasance claim attempting to establish an affirmative
duty to report the abuse.24

16. Dustin v. Curtis, 67 A. 220, 221 (N. H. 1907) (quoting Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 44 A.
809, 811 (N. H. 1897)).
17. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29 (2019).
18. Marquay v. Eno, 662 A.2d 272, 276 (N.H. 1995).
19. See § 169-C:29.
20. Marquay, 662 A.2d at 275–76.
21. Id. at 278.
22. Id. at 278–81.
23. See Berry v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc., 879 A.2d 1124, 1125–
26 (N.H. 2005).
24. Id.
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Berry was a case that cried for a new cause of action, if such a case ever
existed. The plaintiffs were sisters; their father had started sexually abusing
them in a most sickening manner before either daughter was even six years
old.25 His marriage was predictably decaying, and the two spouses went to the
elders of their local Jehovah’s Witnesses Congregation (“Congregation”) for
marital counseling.26 Over the course of this counseling, the plaintiffs’ mother
alerted the elders “on ten to twelve separate occasions” that her husband was
sexually abusing her daughters on a regular basis.27
Instead of reporting the abuse as required under section 169-C:29, the
elders covered it up. Even worse, they also pressured the plaintiffs’ mother to
maintain the coverup, telling her to “be silent . . . and be a better wife.”28 The
abuse halted in 1989, when the plaintiffs were eleven and six years old.29 Over
a decade later, the two sisters sued both their father and the Congregation.30
While the trial court dismissed the suit against the plaintiffs’ father under the
statute of limitations, it allowed the suit against the other defendants to move
forward.31 Thereafter, their father was not a party to the appeal.32
The plaintiffs sought to revisit the claim of a private right of action under
section 169-C:29, despite the court having thoroughly laid that claim to rest
ten years before in Marquay.33 They also raised a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty.34 Most significantly, however, they asked the trial court to recognize a
new common law cause of action for failure to report sexual abuse.35 Pursuant
to Marquay, the trial court dismissed the claim relying on a private right of
action in section 169-C:29, but let the common law claim proceed.36 Later,
though, the trial court dismissed all charges on the grounds of both penitentcleric confidentiality and the Establishment Clause.37
The majority opinion in Berry briefly disposed of both the private right of
action and fiduciary duty claims, and devoted most of its opinion to
discussing whether the plaintiffs had a common law cause of action for failure

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 1133 (Dalianis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1127 (majority opinion).
Id.
Berry, 879 A.2d at 1133 (Dalianis, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1125–26 (majority opinion).
Berry v. Bible, No. 01-C-0318, 2003 WL 25739775, at *3 (N.H. Super. Feb. 06, 2003).
Berry, 879 A.2d at 1125.
Id. at 1126.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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to report the sexual abuse.38 The court devoted the majority of its analysis to
a nonfeasance analysis considering whether the defendants had an
“affirmative duty to aid [the plaintiffs],” and concluded that they did not fall
within any exception that would have incurred such a duty.39 The court
additionally declined to extend liability, and therefore denied all claims raised
by the plaintiffs.
Justice Dalianis dissented, arguing that the court erred in conducting only
a partial analysis.40 She argued that the sheer foreseeability that the
defendants’ actions would encourage and enable continuing abuse in itself
formed a special relationship, and that the defendants thus may have been
liable.41 She further argued that the facts of Berry were unique and would not
create a risk of overextending liability.42 After addressing a number of other
issues raised by the trial court (including the First Amendment issues), she
concluded that the plaintiffs’ suit should have been allowed to proceed.43
Because Berry was decided by the New Hampshire Supreme Court on nonconstitutional grounds, it was not appealed and remains binding authority
within the State of New Hampshire.
This Note begins by presenting the policies and rationale behind a limited
nonfeasance framework (such as the New Hampshire Supreme Court applied
in Berry). It then shows that the majority opinion erred in attempting to avoid
those pitfalls by analyzing the facts solely under a nonfeasance framework.
This Note further argues that while the dissent correctly recognized that the
majority’s conclusion was incorrect and its analysis was incomplete, it also
neglected to consider the possibility that the defendants had committed a
misfeasance by acting in a manner that required and lacked due care.
This Note elaborates on and applies the distinction between nonfeasance
and misfeasance and argues that the defendants’ actions in this case were
actions of misfeasance. This misfeasance should have subjected them to
liability for their active attempt to prevent the plaintiffs from receiving
assistance from other sources. This, in turn, opened them up to liability for
their decision to not report the abuse.
This Note further demonstrates that if the court had applied a standard
misfeasance framework to the facts in Berry, the plaintiffs would have
received a just remedy for the wrong inflicted upon them by the defendants.
38. Berry, 879 A.2d at 1128–31.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1131–32 (Dalianis, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 1133.
42. Id. at 1134.
43. Id. at 1134–37 (addressing issues involving the religious privilege, the Establishment
Clause, and the statute of limitations).
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Finally, it will argue that applying this rule to similar cases would provide
more complete remedies for victims of abuse while avoiding both policy and
constitutional pitfalls that creating a new tort of nonfeasance might incur.
III. BERRY V. WATCHTOWER BIBLE AND TRACT SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, INC.
A.

The Facts

Berry was a heart-breaking case where longstanding judicial principles
seemed to pervert justice rather than promote it. The plaintiffs in Berry had
both been physically and sexually abused by their father between 1983 and
1989.44 During that time, both parents had been dealing with marital issues
and attended counseling at their local Jehovah’s Witnesses congregation.45
Separately from the counseling, the plaintiffs’ mother, Mrs. Poisson, told the
elders between ten and twelve times that her husband had physically and
sexually assaulted her daughters.46 The elders responded to Mrs. Poisson’s
cry for help by dismissing her concerns and condemning her behavior as a
wife.47 They also allegedly “admonished [her] not to speak to secular
authorities upon the pains of disfellowship.”48
The plaintiffs filed suit against the defendant Society and Congregation on
four counts. They alleged common law negligence, statutory negligence
under section 169-C:29, breach of fiduciary duty, and willful concealment of
abuse.49 The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the
statutory negligence and fiduciary duty claims.50 It later dismissed the
remaining claims (of common law negligence and willful concealment of
abuse), asserting that the plaintiffs’ claims, “whether sounding in common
law negligence or deceit, [were] ‘clerical malpractice,’” and that continuing
to hear the case would violate the Establishment Clause.51 The plaintiffs
appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court.
B.

The Majority: Nonfeasance, Therefore No Liability

In a 2-1 decision, the court affirmed the dismissal of all counts, but used
different reasoning than the trial court.52 As a result, the majority did not see
fit to reach the Establishment Clause issue. Instead, the court held that (1)
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Berry, 879 A.2d at 1133 (Dalianis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1127 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 1133 (Dalianis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1129 (majority opinion).
Berry, 879 A.2d at 1125–26.
Id. at 1126.
Id.
Id. at 1131.
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section 169-C:29 did not create a private right of action, (2) the defendants
had no common law duty towards the plaintiffs, and (3) no fiduciary duty
existed to be breached.53
1.

Holdings and Disposition of Claims

The majority opinion first addressed the statutory negligence claim, and
summarily brushed it aside based upon its earlier decision in Marquay.54
Then, it considered the common law and fiduciary duty claims. The court
held that no fiduciary relationship existed between the plaintiffs and the
defendants, and, therefore, that no fiduciary duty had been breached.55 The
court also held that the defendants did not have a common law affirmative
duty to act.56 As a result, the majority saw no need to reach a holding on the
constitutional issue involved in the case, and relied upon other rationales in
affirming the trial court’s dismissal of all claims.57
2.

Statutory Negligence and Fiduciary Duty Rationales

The New Hampshire Supreme Court had already determined that section
169-C:29 did not create a private right of action in Marquay v. Eno ten years
before, and saw no reason to revisit the issue.58 In that case, high school
students filed suit against the school for failing to report chronic abuse of
students by a school employee, and one of the claims raised was for statutory
negligence under section 169-C:29.59
Although the court allowed other claims to proceed in that case, it
dismissed the claim for statutory negligence.60 Under New Hampshire law,
the Marquay court wrote, a criminal statute only created a private right of
action if there was some indication that the legislature intended to do so.61
The court noted that section 169-C:29 was not accompanied by any such
indications, and therefore held that the statute did not create a private right
of action.62 The Berry court declined to overrule Marquay and held that the
plaintiffs could not claim statutory negligence as a cause of action.63
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1128.
55. Berry, 879 A.2d at 1131.
56. Id. at 1130.
57. Id. at 1131.
58. Marquay v. Eno, 662 A.2d 272 (N.H. 1995).
59. Id. at 275–76.
60. Id. at 278.
61. Id. at 276–78.
62. Id. at 278.
63. Berry v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc., 879 A.2d at 1124, 1128
(N.H. 2005).
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The Berry court also brushed aside the plaintiffs’ fiduciary duty claim,
holding that a fiduciary duty only existed where “influence has been acquired
and abused or confidence has been reposed and betrayed.”64 The court noted
that nothing of the sort had occurred between the plaintiffs themselves and
the defendants, as any relationships that existed involved the elders and the
children’s parents (rather than the children themselves).65 Thus, the court
affirmed the trial court’s decision to dismiss the plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary
duty claim.66
3.

Common Law Negligence Rationale

The majority spent most of its analysis addressing the plaintiffs’ common
law claim. Calling failure to report an allegation of nonfeasance, the court
ruled that a duty to act to prevent foreseeable harm generally does not exist.67
The court also listed three exceptions under which a duty to prevent criminal
behavior could arise: (1) where a special relationship existed between the
parties; (2) where special circumstances existed including situations where
the defendant’s acts create an “especial temptation and opportunity” for the
criminal misconduct; or (3) where the defendant voluntarily assumed a duty
to act.68
The plaintiffs only raised the first two exceptions as issues, so the court
declined to analyze whether the defendants had voluntarily assumed a duty
to report sexual abuse.69 The court found that the plaintiffs presented no
evidence of a relationship with the defendants beyond a generic membership
in the Congregation.70 Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, “membership and
adherence to church doctrine by the plaintiffs’ parents [does not create] a
special relationship.”71 Next, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that
the defendants created a special opportunity for sexual abuse by failing to
report it.72 The court held that the exception could not be met by “mere
failure . . . to report . . . [or] improper advice concerning an appropriate
response to . . . criminal activity.”73 Rather, the court held that some actual
act must have taken place, and found that “[t]here is no allegation that the
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 1131.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1128.
Berry, 879 A.2d at 1128.
Id. at 1129.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 1129–30.
Id. at 1130.
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elders created any opportunity for Berry to abuse his daughters.”74 The court
held that neither of the exceptions were met, and that therefore the
defendants had no common law duty that could be breached.75 As a result,
the trial court’s ruling was affirmed.76
C.

The Dissent: Foreseeability, Therefore Liability

Justice Dalianis wrote a second opinion which concurred in part and
dissented in part.77 While she agreed with the majority that there was no
fiduciary relationship or statutory duty, she disagreed with the conclusion
that the defendants had no common law duty.78 As a result, she also found it
necessary to address the First Amendment grounds for the trial court. In
doing so, she argued that the First Amendment did not bar a claim for failure
to report under the circumstances.79
1.

Common Law Negligence

She started by laying out a fourth exception under which a duty to act
could be created—overriding foreseeability.80 She argued that the sheer
foreseeability of the sexual abuse, when combined with the faulty advice
given to Mrs. Poisson, created a special opportunity for the abuse to take
place, thus creating a duty to act.81 Justice Dalianis also inferred that the
abusive husband was present when Mrs. Poisson was ordered to stay silent
and argued that this only increased the severity of the defendants’ conduct.82
If true, she argued, then the defendants were creating a condition where the
abuser was secure in the knowledge that he could continue to act with
impunity.83
2.

First Amendment Analysis

Justice Dalianis also addressed the trial court’s decision to dismiss the
claims on First Amendment grounds. The trial court construed the plaintiffs’
assertions as a claim for negligent counseling and invoked Lemon v.
Kurtzman to state that investigating that claim would “excessively
entangle[]” the government with religion in violation of the Establishment
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Berry, 879 A.2d at 1130.
Id. at 1131.
Id.
Id. (Dalianis, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1135–36.
Berry, 879 A.2d at 1132.
Id. at 1133.
Id. at 1133–34.
Id.
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Clause.84 Dalianis argued that this analysis was flawed and proposed her own
analysis under both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.85
Addressing the Free Exercise Clause, Justice Dalianis applied the United
States Supreme Court’s “neutral law of general applicability” standard.86
However, she noted, before a government statute may be subjected to any
form of scrutiny, the person claiming violation of the Free Exercise Clause
must first demonstrate that the government’s conduct would burden a
specific religious doctrine or practice.87 Observing that the defendants had
not identified any such doctrine or practice that would be burdened by a
finding of liability, Justice Dalianis claimed that the Free Exercise Clause was
therefore not violated.88
Turning then to the Establishment Clause, Justice Dalianis argued that the
trial court misapplied the Lemon standard.89 The defendants had argued (and
successfully persuaded the trial court) that any trial for liability would violate
the excessive entanglements prong of Lemon because “any inquiry into the
counsel given to [the plaintiff’s mother] . . . would require the trial court to
evaluate religious doctrine and the quality and substance of religious
counseling.”90 They further argued that this would be “a claim for ‘clergy
malpractice,’ a cause of action which has not been recognized by any court.”91
Justice Dalianis disagreed.92 She argued that the entanglements doctrine
looked at the effect of the government action rather than the process of it, and
the effect in question was simply whether the government was advancing or
inhibiting religion.93 Additionally, she argued that construing the claim as
“clergy malpractice” was erroneous because “malpractice relies upon
adherence to profession standards. [But t]here is no need to rely upon any
‘professional’ clerical standard here to discover the Wilton Congregation’s
duty in this case.”94 She then implied that the Congregation’s actions went
84. Id. at 1134, 1136 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971)).
85. Id. at 1135–36.
86. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In Smith, the Supreme Court held that a
“neutral law of general applicability” is subject to strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause
only when it also burdens other constitutional protections. Id. at 879–81. This standard was
superseded federally by statute in 1993 by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, but it
remains binding upon state governments. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
87. Berry v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc., 879 A.2d 1124, 1135 (N.H.
2005).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1136.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1134, 1136.
93. Berry, 879 A.2d at 1134, 1136.
94. Id. at 1136.
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beyond mere failure to adhere to a profession standard, arguing that “just as
the State may prevent a church from offering human sacrifices, it may protect
its children against injuries caused by pedophiles by authorizing civil
damages against a church that knowingly . . . creates a situation in which such
injuries are likely to occur.”95 This is in line with the findings of courts in
other states.96
IV. ANALYSIS: REACHING THE RIGHT RESULT FOR THE RIGHT REASON
Negligence as a cause of action contains four elements: a duty to conform
to a standard of conduct, a breach of that duty, actual loss or harm, and a
showing that the breach was the actual and legal cause of the harm.97 The
particular focus of Berry was the element of duty.
When considering the question of duty in the context of Berry and Section
169-C:29, it is important to distinguish between statutory negligence and
negligence per se, because New Hampshire recognizes both.98 The key is to
recognize that a “duty” analysis consists of two parts—the creation or
recognition of a duty, and the definition of that duty. The recognition of a
duty’s existence is a question of law.99 If no duty has been previously
recognized under a specified fact pattern, then one must be created, or no
negligence suit can be maintained.100 A duty can be created in two ways. The
first is by statute, which gives rise to an action of statutory negligence.101 In
New Hampshire, this can only occur if the intent to create a private right of
action by statute was either expressed or implied by the legislature.102 The
second method is through the existence of a common law duty as established
through case precedent.103 This gives rise to a standard negligence action.
Once the existence of a duty has been established, the inquiry then moves
to the definition of that duty. Defining a duty means determining the
standard of conduct to which the defendant must conform under a specified
set of circumstances.104 This standard can be a matter of either fact or law
depending on the method used to define it. Once again, there are two ways
for a duty to be defined—by statute or by case precedent. If the standard of
95. Id. (citing Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 360 (Fla. 2002)).
96. Morrison v. Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown, 68 Pa. D. & C.4th 473 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2004);
State v. Motherwell, 788 P.2d 1066 (Wash. 1990).
97. Kendrick v. East Delavan Baptist Church, 886 F. Supp. 1465, 1472 (E.D. Wis. 1995).
98. Marquay v. Eno, 662 A.2d 272, 277 (N.H. 1995).
99. Walls v. Oxford Mgmt. Co., 633 A.2d 103, 104 (N.H. 1993).
100. Marquay, 662 A.2d at 277.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Kendrick, 886 F. Supp. at 1472.
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conduct is established through a statute, then the duty is defined as a matter
of law and termed negligence per se.105 On the other hand, case precedent
defines duty as a question of “ordinary care” by a reasonable person, which
makes the specific standard of conduct a matter of fact.106
In Berry, the majority correctly dismissed the plaintiffs’ statutory
negligence claim under Marquay.107 As a result, the question addressed here
is whether a duty was created under case precedent and common law. While
the majority was correct in finding that the defendants did not commit a
nonfeasance, both the majority and dissenting judges failed to recognize that
the defendants might have been liable for committing a misfeasance. Thus,
the defendants may have been subject to a duty of general care. If that was
the case, then the duty would have been either defined by Section 169-C:29
as negligence per se or sent to the jury as a question of fact. In either case,
summary judgment should not have been granted for the defendants.
A.

The Limited Nonfeasance Framework

The New Hampshire rule of negligence in cases such as Berry (alleging a
duty to report abuse) must recognize the tension between two opposite but
fundamental principles which underly the rules of negligence. The first is that
“all persons . . . have a general duty to take reasonable care to not subject
other persons to an unreasonable risk of harm.”108 This is the principle from
which all common law duties spring. Every other principle of negligence
serves only to clarify or limit this first rule. The second principle is that courts
will generally not force individuals to take affirmative action to prevent harm
to other persons.109 This, in turn, will often lead courts to conclude that an
individual does not generally have a duty to act, even if inaction would result
in harm.110
The tension between these two principles has arguably given rise to much
of the modern negligence law. Even today, courts still often distinguish
between torts of commission (sometimes called misfeasance claims) and torts
105. Marquay, 662 A.2d at 277 (quoting Bob Godfrey Pontiac, Inc. v. Roloff, 630 P.2d 840,
845 (Or. 1981)).
106. Kendrick, 886 F. Supp. at 1474 (quoting Wisconsin Civil Pattern Jury Instruction
1005).
107. Berry v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc., 879 A.2d 1124, 1128 (N.H.
2005).
108. Walls v. Oxford Mgmt. Co., 633 A.2d 103, 104 (N.H. 1993).
109. Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Defining the Duty of Religious Institutions to Protect
Others: Surgical Instruments, Not Machetes, Are Required, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 11, 18 (2005).
110. Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community of Aid: A Rejoinder to Opponents of
Affirmative Duties to Help Strangers, 71 WASH. U. L. Q. 1, 13 (1993).
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of omission (frequently called nonfeasance claims).111 A misfeasance claim
asserts that the defendant acted in a negligent manner, while a nonfeasance
claim argues that the defendant did not act, and the inaction itself was
negligent.112
It is apparent after even a causal glance that the nonfeasance framework
carries at least one substantial distinction from the misfeasance framework.
Specifically, the misfeasance rule creates the duty, while the nonfeasance rule
abolishes it. The misfeasance framework assumes that, by default, all persons
possess the duty in question; exceptions tend to exempt certain persons from
liability. On the other hand, the nonfeasance framework proclaims that no
person possesses the duty in question; the exceptions tend to subject persons
to a duty which they would otherwise not possess.
1.

The Creation of an Affirmative Duty to Act

As a matter of practically applying these two opposing frameworks, courts
have developed two different ways of articulating when a duty has been
created. Under the first method, an individual incurs a duty by acting; a
violation of this duty is classified as a misfeasance.113 In other words, a person
who acts is subject to the duty to do so in a reasonable manner. On the other
hand, the nonfeasance framework is an inherently limited one. While a duty
under the misfeasance framework is the rule, under the nonfeasance
framework it is the exception. Courts articulate this by stating that an
affirmative duty to act exists only when the conditions of an exception have
been met.114
Thus, a defendant is subject to an affirmative duty to act if circumstances
meet one of three criteria. These three criteria are (1) the existence of a
“special relationship” between the parties, (2) the creation of an “especial
temptation or opportunity for criminal misconduct” by the defendant’s
inaction, and (3) the voluntary assumption of a duty by the defendant.115 All
three have a common thread “of interaction or dependency” between the
parties.116
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. c.
112. E.g., J.A.W. v. Roberts, 627 N.E.2d 802, 809 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (Nonfeasance is “the
complete omission or failure to perform,” while misfeasance is “negligent conduct or active
misconduct”).
113. Id.
114. Berry v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc., 879 A.2d 1124, 1128 (N.H.
2005).
115. Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1007 (N.H. 2003).
116. J.A.W., 627 N.E.2d at 809.
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Policy Reasons for a Limited Nonfeasance Framework

The limited nonfeasance framework oftentimes appears heartless, and
courts have been frequently criticized for it. Even the Restatement (Second)
of Torts subtly critiques the rule:
The result of the rule has been a series of older decisions to
the effect that one human being, seeing a fellow man in dire
peril . . . may sit on the dock, smoke his cigar, and watch the
other drown. Such decisions have been condemned by legal
writers as revolting in any moral sense, but thus far they
remain the law.117
The Restatement (Second) of Torts attributes this rule to history, arguing that
it came about primarily because “courts were far too much occupied with the
more flagrant forms of misbehavior to be greatly concerned with one who
merely did nothing.”118 Other authors—while still critical of the rule—have
been at least slightly more generous, acknowledging that courts have raised
other arguments beyond mere history to justify the limits placed on
nonfeasance liability.119 Courts will defend limits on nonfeasance by asserting
the importance of individual autonomy, the negative consequences of
legislating morality, and the importance of foreseeability.
The importance of individual autonomy is perhaps the most widespread
rationale given for the limited nonfeasance framework.120 This doctrine may
carry special weight in American legal thought for two reasons. The first
reason is that American culture attaches a generally high value to personal
liberty and independence. The second reason, however, is America’s history
with slavery. Some legal scholars have pointed out that Americans have more
of an aversion to the imposition of involuntary servitude than citizens of
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. c.
118. Id.
119. Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 109 at 18–19 (“courts hold that it is not the place of the
courts to decide this moral issue [of affirmative duty]; it is better left to a person’s own
conscience.”); Yeager, supra note 110 at 1 n.1; John G. Culhane, Duty Per Se: Reading Child
Abuse Statutes to Create a Common Law Duty in Favor of Victims, 19 WIDENER L. REV. 73, 77
(2013) (A Delaware court held that “liability . . . should be decided by the legislature, because
that body . . . should make decisions involving social policy.”).
120. Yeager, supra note 110 at 1 n.1. New Hampshire has even gone so far as to describe
the nonfeasance framework as including a balancing test between the plaintiff’s interest in
avoiding harm and the individual’s interest in avoiding forced liability for inaction—an
interest that could only come about via an interest in autonomy from state control. Marquay
v. Eno, 662 A.2d 272, 279 (N.H. 1995) (citing Libbey v. Hampton Water Works Co., 389 A.2d
434, 435 (N.H. 1978)).
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other countries; it seems quite likely that if they are correct, this would stem
from a feeling of guilt over the involuntary servitude regime (i.e., slavery) that
was tolerated for so long by so many.121
Whatever the source of that aversion is, it has caused Americans to
consider their right to autonomy generally more important than any sort of
communal obligation.122 This does not, of course, necessitate an inference
that Americans have no sense of community. Rather, it implies only that
Americans are left to decide communal obligations themselves as individuals,
instead of allowing an outside force (i.e., the collective government) to decide
in their stead.123
This is most likely related to the second reason for a limited nonfeasance
framework. Courts and activists assert that imposing a duty to act would be
legislating morality, and they frequently recoil from the prospect.124 Given
that the United States was founded in part upon the ideals of freedom of
conscience, this is not surprising. Morality is dictated by the conscience, and
so, it comes as no surprise that courts see the legal imposition of moral duties
as a legal imposition upon the conscience itself.
The third reason for a limited nonfeasance framework—particularly in
situations involving criminal conduct such as sexual abuse—may be the close
ties between duty and foreseeability. Courts will generally refuse to impose a
duty to prevent unforeseeable conduct.125 Courts also usually presume that
criminal conduct is generally not foreseeable.126 As a result, where the
commission of a crime is the alleged consequence of a defendant’s inaction,
the limited nonfeasance doctrine could provide a convenient method for the
court to determine whether the defendant is liable, foreseeability
notwithstanding.
B.

Berry’s Application of the Limited Nonfeasance Framework

In applying the general rule of duty to the facts of a specific case, the first
step is to determine if the defendant is accused of acting (also called
“misfeasance”) or not acting (also called “nonfeasance”).127 If the defendant
is accused of misfeasance, then he is subject to a general duty to act in
accordance with a standard of conduct, whether that standard be defined by
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Yeager, supra note 110 at 2.
Id.
Id. at 13–14.
Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 109 at 19.
Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1006 (N.H. 2003)..
Id.
J.A.W. v. Roberts, 627 N.E.2d 802, 815 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
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statute (negligence per se) or by the common law (ordinary care).128 If, on the
other hand, the defendant is accused of nonfeasance, then he may only be
charged with a duty if one of the three conditions are met.129 In Berry, both
the majority and the dissent skipped over this step of the analysis, and instead
assumed that the entire case was subject solely to the nonfeasance framework.
This was perhaps the gravest error committed by both the majority and
dissent in Berry because it distorted the reasoning of both decisions at a
fundamental level. The majority was correct in conducting the nonfeasance
analysis of the case, but it failed to reach a correct disposition of the case by
failing to see the misfeasance issue. The dissent, on the other hand, reached
the correct disposition of the common law claim; however, because the
dissenting Justice also failed to spot the misfeasance issue, her rationale was
weak and unpersuasive.
1.

The Majority Decision: The Wrong Result for the Wrong
Reason

The majority was correct in recognizing that an affirmative duty to act is
limited to those circumstances where either (1) a special relationship existed
between the parties, (2) the defendants’ actions created some “special
temptation or opportunity for criminal misconduct,” or (3) the defendant
voluntarily assumed the affirmative duty to act.130 Voluntary assumption was
not raised by the plaintiffs in Berry, so it will not be addressed here.131
A special relationship would exist only if the defendants “[were] required
by law to take or . . . voluntarily [took] custody of [the plaintiffs] under
circumstances such as to deprive [them of] normal opportunities for
protection.”132 That did not happen in this case, as the plaintiffs’ only
connection with the defendants was membership in their congregation.133
The majority’s refusal to recognize a special relationship between clergy and
the general congregation is in line with precedent from other states.134
Even in the absence of a special relationship between the parties, a duty to
act may be created when a defendant’s actions create a special opportunity
128. Marquay v. Eno, 662 A.2d 272, 277 (N.H. 1995).
129. Remsburg, 816 A.2d at 1007.
130. Id.
131. Berry v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc., 879 A.2d 1124, 1129 (N.H.
2005).
132. Marquay, 662 A.2d at 279.
133. Berry¸ 879 A.2d at 1129.
134. See Doe v. Liberatore, 478 F. Supp. 2d 742 (M.D. Pa. 2007); see also Fortin v. Roman
Catholic Bishop of Portland, 871 A.2d 1208 (Me. 2005).
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for criminal misconduct. “A party who realizes or should realize that his
conduct has created a condition which involves an unreasonable risk of harm
to another has a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent the risk from
taking effect.”135 This conduct may include other negligent conduct by the
alleged tortfeasor.136
If the inquiry is limited solely to the nonfeasance claim, as the majority’s
opinion was, then this criterion remains unfulfilled. Silence is not speech, and
failure to act is not itself an action. Thus, the majority was correct in
reasoning that mere failure to report cannot create an opportunity for
criminal misconduct.137 However, the majority then claimed that such special
circumstances were only created where the defendant had “exercised control
[over the circumstances].”138 The majority implied that if the defendants in
Berry had “created a condition or enhanced a foreseeable risk of criminal
conduct which they could independently and affirmativ[ly] control,” then
they might be exposed to liability.139 The majority also stated, “[The elders]
did not create the risk of harm to the children nor control its cessation or
continuation.”140 It is important to recognize that control of the situation was
placed in the hands of the elders the moment they were informed of the
abuse; the abuser was at their mercy to expose or protect.141 Unfortunately,
the majority did not believe that premise to be true, and therefore they
concluded that the elders did not create a special circumstance or risk of
harm.142
The majority’s analysis was flawed for two reasons. First, the court rooted
its decision in the rule that no general duty exists to protect a person from
the criminal acts of a third party.143 This rule, in turn, sprouts straight out of
the nonfeasance framework. However, although the nonfeasance rule is
sometimes treated as a standalone basis for liability, it is important to
remember that the nonfeasance rule is not actually a source of duty—it is a
limitation of it. By rooting their analysis solely within a doctrine limiting
liability, the majority risked losing sight of what establishes duty in the first
place. Unfortunately, this is precisely what happened when the majority
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Walls v. Oxford Mgmt. Co., 633 A.2d 103, 106 (N.H. 1993).
Id.
Berry, 879 A.2d at 1130.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1125–26.
Id. at 1130–31.
Berry, 879 A.2d at 1128.
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overlooked the defendants’ decision to threaten Mrs. Poisson into keeping
her husband’s sexual abuse a secret.144
This mistake thus assisted in causing the second error that the majority
committed—it failed to distinguish misfeasance from nonfeasance. Negligent
failure to report alleges nonfeasance. Willful concealment, on the other hand,
alleges a misfeasance. Misfeasance is an action, which means it automatically
creates a duty to act according to a standard of conduct. No special
relationship is required to find a common law duty on that count.
It is also worth noting that the majority never explicitly considered the
plaintiffs’ claim for deceit or willful concealment of abuse. The trial court
sustained this claim against a summary judgment motion but then dismissed
it for violation of the Establishment Clause and penitent-clerical privilege
under the New Hampshire Rules of Evidence.145 The majority acknowledged
the filing of the claim and the circumstances surrounding it (namely, the
pressure exerted by the elders upon Mrs. Poisson to keep silent).146 Further,
this claim was kept alive through an appeal of the First Amendment question
raised by the plaintiffs.147 However, aside from a brief mention of the claim
in the procedural history, any analysis of it is entirely absent from the
majority opinion in Berry.148 The omission is very abnormal, especially
considering that the majority declined to engage in the First Amendment
analysis because the trial court’s decision on all counts was affirmed, “albeit
for different reasons.”149
This was another serious misstep by the Berry majority. Rule 505 and the
First Amendment were the only grounds given by the trial court for
dismissing the claim for deceit, and the plaintiffs raised that issue at the
appellate level.150 Because the claim of deceit was never addressed by the
majority, Rule 505 and the First Amendment were still the only grounds for
barring the claim, and the majority never ruled on that question presented
for appeal. Failing to consider that question was an error because it weighs
heavily on the question of misfeasance.151

144. Id. at 1129.
145. Id. at 1126; N.H. R. EVID. 505.
146. Berry v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y, Inc., No. 01-C-0318, 2003 WL
25739777 (N.H. Super. Nov. 04, 2003).
147. Berry, 879 A.2d at 1125–26.
148. Id. at 1126.
149. Id. at 1131.
150. Berry, 2003 WL 25739777.
151. See infra Section IV.C.1.
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The Dissent: The Right Result, But Still for the Wrong
Reason

Justice Dalianis’s opinion was largely correct in its conclusions and
preferred disposition of the case. However, the reasoning that she relied on
in reaching those conclusions did contain several flaws, including her
reliance upon precedent of a dubious nature. This most likely had a
significant impact on the majority’s rejection of her ultimate position.
Justice Dalianis rested the majority of her position on the doctrine of
overriding foreseeability, which she cited as a fourth exception to the generally
limited nonfeasance framework.152 The overriding foreseeability exception
holds, in essence, that a landlord may be liable for foreseeable criminal acts,
even if there was no physical or security defect which satisfies the hazardous
circumstances exception.153 According to Justice Dalianis, the overriding
foreseeability exception was folded into the hazardous circumstances
exception in Remsburg v. Docusearch.154
The only problem is that the case Justice Dalianis uses to provide the
overriding foreseeability exception—Walls v. Oxford Management Co.—
“reject[ed] liability based solely . . . on a doctrine of overriding
foreseeability.”155 The doctrine is further complicated because the court
arguably relied upon that “rejected” doctrine seven years later in Iannelli v.
Burger King Corp.156 However, that case is an outlier; Justice Dalianis herself
admits that “the status of the overriding foreseeability exception in our case
law is not clear.”157
There is no question that Walls had explicitly rejected liability based solely
on overriding foreseeability.158 There is also little question, upon reading
Iannelli, that liability, in that case, was based solely upon the foreseeability of
harm.159 Justice Dalianis took this contradiction in the court’s precedent to
mean that a lack of conduct could still create a hazardous circumstance if the
harm was sufficiently foreseeable.160 However, this would mean outright
ignoring Walls, which was a step that the majority was not willing to take.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
1132.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Berry, 879 A.2d at 1131–32 (Dalianis, J., dissenting).
Walls v. Oxford Mgmt. Co., 633 A.2d 103, 106 (N.H. 1993).
Berry, 879 A.2d at 1132.
Walls, 633 A.2d at 107.
Iannelli v. Burger King Corp., 761 A.2d 417, 420 (N.H. 2000). See Berry, 879 A.2d at
Berry, 879 A.2d at 1132.
Walls, 633 A.2d at 107.
Iannelli, 761 A.2d at 420–21.
Berry, 879 A.2d at 1133.
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This skepticism was attached to her overall conclusion and caused the
majority to distinguish Iannelli by arguing that the key factor in Ianelli was
whether the defendant(s) “exercised control . . . [or] created a condition or
enhanced a foreseeable risk of criminal conduct which they could
independently and affirmatively control.”161 Although Justice Dalianis sought
to rebut this by accusing the majority of making a “retrospective statement
of the law,” the damage was done.162 The disagreement over the “overriding
foreseeability” doctrine should have been irrelevant because the plaintiffs also
accused the defendants of actually unjustly exerting control to conceal the
abuse. Instead, the presupposition that the nonfeasance framework was the
only applicable theory limited the discussion.163
This fixation on nonfeasance by Justice Dalianis was even more ironic,
given that Justice Dalianis still argued that the defendants acted by advising
Mrs. Poisson.164 While Justice Dalianis identified the defendants’ alleged
concealment as a significant event, she misunderstood its significance by
failing to recognize it as potential misfeasance.165 Instead, she alluded to the
“active[] facilitate[ion of] the continuing abuse” as “giving bad advice.”166
This was a gross understatement, and completely ignored the plaintiffs’ claim
for willful concealment of abuse.167
Justice Dalianis’s Establishment Clause analysis also bears a need for
examination. The defendants argued that liability would violate the famous
Lemon test by excessively entangling the courts with the affairs of their
congregation.168 Justice Dalianis disagreed.169 She argued that the excessive
entanglements doctrine was merely one part of the inquiry into whether the

161. Id. at 1130 (majority opinion).
162. Id. at 1133 (Dalianis, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 1130 (majority opinion).
164. Id. at 1133 (Dalianis, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 1133–34 (Dalianis, J., dissenting).
166. Berry, 879 A.2d at 1133–34.
167. The majority also referred to the elders’ conduct as “failure to dispense proper advice.”
Id. at 1130 (majority opinion). The exercise in vocabulary that phrases misfeasance as an
omission of a response is a frequent result of clever lawyers using rhetorical trickery to
obfuscate the difference between commission and omission. See Saul Levmore, Waiting for
Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirmative Obligations,
72 VA. L. REV. 879 (1986) (“The clever law student is even able to turn commissions into
omissions by arguing, for example, that negligent driving is nothing more than the failure to
brake.”).
168. Berry, 879 A.2d at 1136 (Dalianis, J., dissenting).
169. Id.
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government action advanced or inhibited religion.170 In other words, she
argued that as long as imposing a duty would not advance or inhibit religion,
the entanglement was not excessive.
Justice Dalianis’s casual dismissing of what the Supreme Court has
described as a separate element is concerning. Although the Supreme Court
did state that entanglement is significant because it has bearing on the effect
of a statute, nowhere did the Court say that it should merge with one of the
previous two elements.171 The Court’s statement regarding the purpose of the
entanglement analysis explained why the element was important, not how to
resolve whether the element was present.172 The accuracy of Justice Dalianis’s
conclusion is beyond the scope of this Note. Nevertheless, it should be noted
that, regardless of whether her conclusion was correct, her reasoning was not
sound.
On the other hand, Justice Dalianis’s discussion of the trial court’s claim
that the plaintiffs were alleging “clerical malpractice” (which, the trial court
argued, meant that it should be dismissed) consisted of some solid
reasoning.173 Unfortunately, a flaw in her underlying perspective of the case
undermined her argument once more. She noted that malpractice inherently
requires measurement against a professional standard and that malpractice
does not exist where the standard is ordinary negligence.174 While this is true,
it still misses the point of the plaintiffs’ allegations, and thus reaches only half
the issue. Their claim for willful concealment alleges not only that the elders
were negligent, but also that they acted intending to inflict a certain harm (a
lack of intervention by others who arguably had a duty to intervene).175 An
allegation of intentional deceit is hardly an allegation of malpractice because
it is a standard that applies far beyond any particular profession. To recognize
this, though, would first require Justice Dalianis to have addressed the claim
of deceit in the first place. This was something that she failed to do; as a result,
her argument was neither as forceful nor as persuasive as it could have been.

170. Id.
171. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232–33 (1997).
172. Id. It is notable that the Court, immediately after saying that entanglement should be
treated as assisting in the effects analysis, then proceeded to analyze entanglement as its own
element rather than relying upon the conclusion of the effects analysis. Id.
173. Berry, 879 A.2d at 1136.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1129–30 (majority opinion).

342213-Liberty_Law_14-2_Text.indd 129

5/13/20 7:35 AM

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

404
C.

[Vol. 14:2

Analyzing Berry’s Rationale Under a Misfeasance Framework

The Berry majority held that because the plaintiffs’ allegations rested solely
on the defendants’ failure to report the abuse, they were only alleging
nonfeasance.176 The majority also held that the plaintiffs failed to meet an
exception to the limited nonfeasance rule and that the defendants, therefore,
owed no duty of affirmative action to the plaintiffs.177 Relying on those
holdings, the majority affirmed the dismissal of all claims by the plaintiffs.178
However, the majority could only reach that result by ignoring the
defendants’ willful concealment of the abuse suffered by the plaintiffs. The
plaintiffs had a claim for misfeasance against the defendants because of that
willful action. Additionally, that misfeasance opened the door to hold the
defendants liable for nonfeasance as well.
1.

Implying a General Duty of Care in Berry

The plaintiffs’ count of misfeasance will be addressed first—that is, the
count of “willful concealment” (or, as the trial court termed it, “deceit”).179
The basic principle of misfeasance is that when a person acts, they acquire a
duty to act with reasonable care.180 Thus, when a plaintiff alleges that a person
has acted without reasonable care, they have a common law action for
negligence. In such a misfeasance case, the question of whether the
defendant’s action was reasonable or not is typically a question of fact left up
to the jury to decide.181 Therefore, if the defendants in Berry did act—i.e., if
misfeasance was alleged—then the court should have left the matter to the
jury. The fact that the trial court only dismissed the claim for willful
concealment of abuse after the defendants raised an Establishment Clause
challenge supports this conclusion.182
The result differs because the analysis acknowledges that in alleging that
the defendants engaged in willful concealment by pressuring Mrs. Poisson
from contacting the authorities, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
acted.183 The moment the defendants did so, they created a duty for
themselves to, at the very least, take reasonable care to not subject another
person to an unreasonable risk of harm by their actions.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 1130.
Id. at 1130–31.
Id. at 1131.
Berry, 879 A.2d at 1126.
Walls v. Oxford Mgmt. Co., 633 A.2d 103, 104 (N.H. 1993).
Id.
Berry, 879 A.2d at 1126 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1133 (Dalianis, J., dissenting).
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Whether or not their advice to conceal the abuse was reasonable is not a
question of law, but is a question of fact. The standard applied by the jury, in
that case, would be either negligence per se (under Section 169-C:29) or
ordinary care. Under either standard, the defendants arguably acted
unreasonably, and they breached their duty by threatening Mrs. Poisson with
eternal damnation if she asked the authorities to rescue her daughters from
her husband.184
Neither the majority nor the dissent recognized that this was the proper
standard to apply. The resulting confusion set the stage for an erroneous
analysis of the common law negligence count.
2.

Reapplying a Nonfeasance Analysis in Light of Misfeasance

The majority concluded that the defendants did not have a duty to report
because they did not fall under any of the three exceptions to the limited
nonfeasance framework.185 According to the majority, they did not have a
special relationship with the plaintiffs; they did not by their conduct create a
hazardous circumstance or special opportunity for criminal activity; and they
did not voluntarily assume a duty to report abuse.186 Justice Dalianis
disagreed, but only because she believed that even inaction could create a
hazardous circumstance if the risk of harm was sufficiently foreseeable.187
This reasoning—both in its conclusions and its limits—could only be
sustained by assuming that the defendants never acted. However, the
defendants did act by threatening the plaintiffs’ mother into silence.188 Such
an action constitutes conduct, which rebuts the majority’s main premise; it
also eliminates the need for the suspect “overriding foreseeability” doctrine
used by Justice Dalianis.
Instead, the defendants committed a tort of misfeasance. This tort of
misfeasance created a circumstance in which a previously committed crime
could reoccur—repeatedly. This circumstance fits quite neatly within the
hazardous circumstances exception to the limited nonfeasance framework.
Essentially, by actively working to cut-off the plaintiffs from any avenue of
assistance, the defendants incurred upon themselves a duty to provide the
assistance they were attempting to prevent. This establishes a common law
duty by the defendants to report the abuse to the authorities. Whether that
duty was defined by Section 169-C:29 or by the common law standard of
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 1129 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1128–31.
Id.
Id. at 1133 (Dalianis, J., dissenting).
Berry, 879 A.2d at 1129 (majority opinion).
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ordinary care—i.e., whether the duty was common law negligence or
negligence per se—would be a question for the court to decide, but the duty
did exist. As a result, dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims for want of a common
law duty was improper.
From one perspective, this does not impose a new cause of action at
common law for failure to report abuse—instead, it analyzes the facts in Berry
under the standard negligence framework. If a court insisted on dubbing it a
new cause of action, however, it would be strictly limited to imposing a duty
to report abuse upon religious organizations—or, really, any other person—
who had taken active steps to prevent other people with knowledge of the
abuse from reporting it to the proper authorities.
D.

Policy Implications of Applying a Misfeasance Framework to Berry

Analyzing the Berry situation under a standard negligence framework
ensures that the doctrine will not get carried away. It also ensures that this
doctrine is not a “loophole” to be used by unscrupulous attorneys to achieve
damage rewards that would otherwise be barred by the limited nonfeasance
framework. More importantly, however, it also leaves the policy goals of the
limited nonfeasance doctrine intact.
Three specific policy goals prominently underlie the limited nonfeasance
doctrine. 189 Courts do not wish to override individual autonomy and make
all persons, everywhere, subject to government controls on their behavior.190
A closely related (but not identical) policy is the reluctance of courts to
impose or legislate morality from the bench.191 Finally, courts are very
reluctant to punish people for the consequences of their acts that could not
be foreseen.192 The Berry analysis proposed here does not violate any of these
rationales.
First, it does not override individual autonomy. The only reason that an
individual would be subjected to an affirmative requirement to act is to
prevent harm inflicted by his own actions. This is a duty which society
already imposes; it is also one that courts have not been averse to enforcing.
This paradigm recognizes that an individual’s autonomy will be overridden
by the courts only after that defendant has overridden the autonomy of the
victim or a victim’s would-be helper. This limitation on a failure to report
litigation already exists within the existing misfeasance/nonfeasance
framework, but is often overlooked.
189.
190.
191.
192.

See supra at IV.A.2.
See supra at IV.A.2.
See supra at IV.A.2.
See supra at IV.A.2.
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Second, this analysis means that courts will not be legislating morality.
Rather, they will be providing remedies where there was an actual infliction
of injury. Where a potential defendant merely fails to report ongoing abuse,
he is technically not inflicting the injury himself. Instead, he is merely
standing by as someone else inflicts the injury. Although such a scenario is
morally abhorrent, the courts will not intervene. Where they will intervene,
however, is where the defendant acts to encourage or protect the individual
inflicting the harm. Where that happens, the defendant is now actively
helping to inflict the injuries. This is no longer a matter of mere morality, but
a question of whether the law will provide a remedy for the very thing it exists
to prevent. Providing a remedy under such circumstances is not legislating
morality. Therefore, the proposed analysis does not violate this policy, either.
The third policy is one of not punishing people for the unforeseeable
criminal acts of others. As before, analyzing failure to report cases to
determine if misfeasance took place does not impede or violate this policy. If
anything, it helps to enforce it by tying a duty to report abuse to actions meant
to prevent others from reporting it. Such actions act as a proxy, attesting to
the state of mind, which knows that the abuse has happened and is likely to
happen again. Additionally, it subjects a duty to the “creation of a risk of
harm” element of the limited nonfeasance framework, which itself inherently
includes the element of foreseeability.
Tying failure-to-report cases to acts of misfeasance in the common law is
certainly no substitute for legislative action. However, it allows courts to
pursue their policy goals while also providing justice for victims who would
otherwise be left without a remedy. It would require careful analysis on the
part of both attorneys and judges. However, although the American legal
system might perhaps be justified in recoiling from vagueness or
uncertainties, it should not shrink from solutions simply because they require
attention to detail. In the hands of conscientious litigators and jurists, this
proposed analysis provides a balanced approach and it ensures that courts
can provide justice without compromising the principles undergirding the
rules of the common law.
V. CONCLUSION
The majority opinion in Berry feared that penalizing “mere failure . . . to
report . . . [or] improper advice” would unreasonably extend liability.193 But
tortious misfeasance is not “mere” anything, and conceding that the
defendants’ misfeasance here created a special opportunity for sexual abuse
would not have unreasonably extended liability to any circumstance it had
193. Berry, 879 A.2d at 1130.
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not already reached. The majority erred because it did not recognize this fact,
and the plaintiffs once again suffered the consequences of another’s refusal
to intervene on their behalf.
Further research on Berry and the questions it raises is encouraged. In
particular, the First Amendment analysis used by both the trial court and
Justice Dalianis’s dissenting opinion requires more analysis. The attempted
(and successful) use of Lemon as a shield against misfeasance liability by the
defendants in Berry was disconcerting, and other courts have found that the
Establishment Clause does not prevent courts from holding churches liable
for failure to report abuse.194 Although that topic is outside the scope of this
Note, an analysis synthesizing the reasoning of those courts would be a timely
addition to this developing area of tort law.

194. See, e.g., Morrison v. Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown, 68 Pa. D. & C.4th 473 (Pa. Com.
Pl. 2004); State v. Motherwell, 788 P.2d 1066 (Wash. 1990).
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